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AN ALMOST ARCHEOLOGICAL DIG:  
FINDING A SURPRISINGLY RICH  
EARLY UNDERSTANDING  
OF SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS* 
Louise Weinberg** 
There exists a hitherto unnoticed early disquisition on 
substantive due process, setting out in 1840 a theory of 
substantive due process far more powerful than the bare-bones 
concept Chief Justice Taney would deploy seventeen years later 
in Dred Scott. This remarkable text has languished in obscurity 
until now because it is layered over and threaded through with 
matters extraneous to it. It exists buried within the report of an 
oral argument about a different question,1 in a case, Holmes v. 
Jennison,2 about a wholly unrelated problem.3 The ancient relic 
has now been unearthed, in an almost archeological dig, by 
separating its fragments from the layered deposit in which it is 
submerged, as if lifting the clay from a potsherd. 
With a single exception,4 a 1993 paper on the Ninth 
Amendment, I have found no mention of this old argument of 
counsel in books or articles or cases. There appears to be no 
quotation or excerpt from it. As far as the Tarlton Law Library, 
Westlaw, or Google can discover—apart from the exception 
noted—the argument has no existence beyond the official 
reports of the case in which it appeared. And in the 1993 paper 
in which this argument of counsel is mentioned, there is no 
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 1. Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 555–57 (1840) (Cornelius P. Van Ness 
for the plaintiff in error) (arguing that the protections of the Fifth Amendment Due 
Process Clause should be read to apply to the states as well as the nation). 
 2. 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540. 
 3. Id. at 569 (Taney, C.J.) (plurality opinion) (holding that the treaty power is 
exclusively federal). 
 4. John Choon Yoo, Our Declaratory Ninth Amendment, 42 EMORY L.J. 967, 1004 
(1993) (referring to the view of the Ninth Amendment argued by Cornelius P. Van Ness 
for the plaintiff in error in Jennison). 
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recognition of the existence of the surprisingly rich theory of due 
process discoverable within it. 
The fons et origo of substantive due process is commonly 
supposed5 to be Dred Scott,6 the first Supreme Court case to 
strike down an act of Congress on a substantive due process 
ground. But scholarly examination of antebellum case law has 
shown that at least a skeletal concept of substantive due process, 
as it appears in Dred Scott, was already familiar at the time Dred 
Scott was decided.7 Lawyers and judges understood, then as now, 
the half-substantive, half-procedural point that due process 
requires reasonable law. Arbitrary or irrational law is not due 
process.8 Nor may good law be applied unreasonably, either by 
officials or judges.9 Nor may officials take other arbitrary or 
irrational action. Such acts or laws are not the process that is 
due.10 
But writers have found little, if any, early intimation that 
due process was thought to protect fundamental rights. Where in 
 
 5. E.g., Cass R. Sunstein, The Dred Scott Case, 1 GREEN BAG 2d 39, 44 (1997). 
 6. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
 7. See, e.g., BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 117 
(1995); Louise Weinberg, Overcoming Dred, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 733, 745–46 (2007); 
James W. Ely, Jr., The Oxymoron Reconsidered: Myth and Reality in the Origins of 
Substantive Due Process, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 315, 319 (1999). 
 8. Thus, law that is duly enacted may nevertheless not be due process. Bloomer v. 
McQuewan, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 539, 553 (1852) (Taney, C.J.) (stating that patent 
legislation depriving the plaintiff of existing property could not be due process). See also, 
e.g., Cochran v. Van Surlay, 20 Wend. 365, 383 (N.Y. 1838) (stating the rule that the state 
may not deprive anyone “of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; i.e., by 
mere arbitrary legislation”).  
 9. See the 1815 argument of counsel in United States v. Bryan, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 
374, 378 (1815): “[A creditor] ought to have full reason to rely that . . . [a] subsequent 
enactment . . . [would not] enhance his risk of danger beyond what it was when the debt 
was contracted. Such a mode of legislation . . .  would be virtually taking away private 
‘property’ without ‘due process of law.’ . . . [It] could not have been ‘necessary and 
proper;’ and is not warranted by the constitution.” (emphases in original). Today we also 
understand that law may not be chosen arbitrarily. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 
U.S. 302 (1981) (plurality opinion), reh’g denied, 450 U.S. 971 (1981), and cases there 
cited (requiring rational choices of law as between states, under the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment); cf. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) 
(requiring rational choices of law as between nation and state, explaining that Congress 
lacks power to make state law). For the argument that the Due Process Clauses provide 
unified theory for both sorts of cases, see Louise Weinberg, Back to the Future: The New 
General Common Law, 35 J. MAR. L. & COM. 523 (2004); Louise Weinberg, The Federal-
State Conflict of Laws: “Actual” Conflicts, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1743 (1992); Louise 
Weinberg, Federal Common Law, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 805 (1989); Louise Weinberg 
Choice of Law and Minimal Scrutiny, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 440 (1982). 
 10. Cf. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring) 
(stating that the Due Process Clause contains a substantive component that bars certain 
arbitrary, wrongful government actions “regardless of the fairness of the procedures used 
to implement them.”). 
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our early cases can we find an understanding that the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment protects fundamental, 
substantive liberties? Liberties not enumerated in the Bill of 
Rights? 
To be sure, Dred Scott’s due process might be read to have 
protected liberty as well as property, specifically implicating a 
right to travel. Taney declared, referring to the Fifth 
Amendment, that a law that has the effect of destroying a man’s 
property, merely because he travels with his property to a place 
at which such property has been abolished by law, cannot be due 
process.11 But Taney’s was hardly an encompassing vision of 
fundamental unenumerated rights. Nothing in his terse 
pronouncement protecting property from confiscation by action 
of law necessarily implied specific protection even for property 
rights already mentioned in the Bill of Rights. (Today, of course, 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment literally 
does protect against state violations of rights enumerated in the 
Bill of Rights, by “incorporating” them.) Rather, Taney was 
saying, in line with the most expansive general understandings of 
the time, that due process substantively protects against law that 
is arbitrary and unreasonable. Dred Scott’s protection against 
unreasonable law also did not necessarily imply protection 
against violation of rights which, like the right to travel, are not 
enumerated in the Bill of Rights, but which may be as 
fundamental as those that are. 
Yet identifiable fundamental rights, although unenumer-
ated, would seem to call for judicial protection. The Ninth 
Amendment acknowledges the existence of such rights and 
cautions that the Constitution not be construed in disparagement 
or in derogation of them. In the antebellum period, 
unenumerated rights—rights to marry, to have children, to seek 
gainful employment, to have access to courts, and so forth—
were sometimes assigned to a category of unalienable rights 
antedating the Constitution, the existence of which is 
acknowledged in the Declaration of Independence.12 Or they 
 
 11. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 450: (“And an act of Congress which deprives a citizen of 
the United States of his liberty or property, merely because he came himself or brought 
his property into a particular Territory of the United States, and who had committed no 
offence against the laws, could hardly be dignified with the name of due process of 
law.”). 
 12. For a modern acknowledgement of this antique position, see Troxel v. 
Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 91 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting): (“In my view, a right of parents 
to direct the upbringing of their children is among the ‘unalienable Rights’ with which 
the Declaration of Independence proclaims ‘all men . . . are endowed by their 
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were conceived as essential attributes or privileges of state 
citizenship.13 This latter understanding, as regards United States 
citizenship, appears in Dred Scott, but not in its holding striking 
down an act of Congress. Rather, it appears in the passages in 
Dred Scott rejecting black rights by denying the possibility of 
black citizenship.14 In Chief Justice Taney’s admired early 
opinion in the Charles River Bridge case, a suggestion of 
substantive due process appears when he launches his Contracts 
Clause analysis with Magna Carta and the Due Process Clause.15 
But until now, we have not found an antebellum discussion of 
substantive due process in the potent sense in which we 
understand the doctrine today. We have not found due process 
asserted in protection of unenumerated fundamental rights, not 
in that early period. The interest of the edited argument from 
Holmes v. Jennison, reproduced below, resides in the fact that it 
does seem to embody, as early as 1840, something like the 
modern, if still contested position, as it has developed since 
Meyer v. Nebraska,16 that due process protects unenumerated 
fundamental rights. 
Greatly complicating the discovery of this find is the fact 
that counsel making the argument, Governor Van Ness,17 was 
not, in his own mind, making a substantive due process 
argument. Articulating a theory of substantive due process was 
not the end he had in view. His argument was not focused on the 
proposition that the Due Process Clause is substantive as well as 
procedural. He was not focused on making the points that in fact 
he did make: that the Due Process Clause is not only a limit on 
government power, and not only a shield against arbitrary 
 
Creator.’ . . . The Declaration of Independence, however, is not a legal prescription 
conferring powers upon the courts. . . .”). 
 13. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551–52 (C.C.Pa. 1823). In the cited passage, 
Justice Bushrod Washington, sitting on a circuit, listed certain property and civic rights as 
examples of privileges and immunities of citizenship within the meaning of Article IV. 
That Article, which touches upon the states, provides in its second section that “[t]he 
Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the 
several States.” U.S. CONST., art. IV, § 2. 
 14. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 410 passim; id. at 411 (declaring that the Constitution was 
not intended to confer on black persons “or their posterity the blessings of liberty, or any 
of the personal rights so carefully provided for the citizen”). 
 15. Proprietors of Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. 
420, 648–50 (1837). 
 16. 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (holding in part that the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment protects the family from unreasonable state interference in the 
rearing of its children) (citing Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)).  
 17. This was Cornelius P. Van Ness (1782-1852), who had been Governor of 
Vermont from 1823-1826. 
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governance, but also a positive protection of fundamental 
human rights. The original unedited passage from Van Ness’s 
argument, which can be read in the Appendix, was about 
something else, and, understandably, no previous commentator 
has considered it in its possible bearing on the history of 
substantive due process theory. All that Van Ness did mean to 
argue in this passage was that the Due Process Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment should be applied against the states as well as 
the nation. This proposal was bold enough, a quarter-century 
before the Fourteenth Amendment’s own Due Process Clause. 
And the Fourteenth Amendment was the hard-won fruit of civil 
war and military occupation. Chief Justice Taney did not deign 
to respond to the suggestion. Justice Barbour simply noted his 
belief that this point, “urged at the bar,” was controlled by 
Barron v. Baltimore.18 
Nevertheless, from Van Ness’s original text we can extract 
and bring to light an early conception of a richly substantive due 
process, apparently unique for its time.19 What emerges, and is 
reprinted immediately below, may be the most detailed and 
impassioned early statement of substantive due process theory 
we have. It develops in extenso a theory of a substantive due 
process that, within an over-arching concept of personal liberty, 
protects principles—unenumerated and fundamental rights—
which lie at the foundation of that liberty. These rights are 
acknowledged by the Ninth Amendment. And in this 
understanding, the Due Process Clause imposes affirmative 
duties on the nation to protect those liberties. What we have 
here, then, is a fully realized early expression of substantive due 
process virtually as it would emerge in the Supreme Court in the 
twentieth century, eventually bestowing upon the most intimate 
private human acts, relations, and choices a long hoped-for 
freedom from government interference. In some ways the 
argument presented below goes beyond even these under-
standings. 
 
 18. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833) (Marshall, C.J.) (holding that the rights enumerated 
in the Bill of Rights were protections against national, not state action). 
 19. For perhaps the narrowest procedural antebellum understanding of the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, see JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE 
CONSTITUTION 709–10 (Story abridgment, 1833) (describing the Due Process Clause as 
protecting against forfeiture of life, liberty, or property on “general warrants”). 
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EDITED EXTRACT20 
CORNELIUS P. VAN NESS 
ARGUMENT FOR THE PLAINTIFF IN ERROR 
HOLMES V. JENNISON (1840)21 
We have now arrived at the third and last point; 
which is, . . . [whether] the act now complained of 
was . . . a violation of the provision in the Constitution 
of the United States which declares that ‘no person 
shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law.’ 
. . . 
. . . When we speak of a limitation of power, we 
have naturally in view some power which, without such 
limitation, might be lawfully exercised; and of this 
character are the prohibitions in the original 
Constitution, whether relating to the general 
government, or to the states. That some of the 
amendments are of the same character is 
unquestionably true. But there are others which are not 
so; among which is the one containing the clause 
declaring that ‘no person shall be deprived of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law.’ These 
latter cannot be considered as limitations of power, but 
are to be understood as declarations of rights. Of 
absolute rights, inherent in the people, and of which no 
power can legally deprive them. 
The right of personal liberty has existed ever since 
the first creation of man, and is incident to his nature. 
It has been recognized from the earliest organization of 
society, and the first institution of civil government, 
until the present time. And for the plain reason that 
this sacred right is beyond the reach of all legitimate 
power, it cannot properly be the subject of a limitation 
 
 20. Ellipses indicate omissions; brackets indicate summary insertions. 
 21. Jennison, 39 U.S. at 555–57. 
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to the action of a regular government. . . . The 
declaration of this right, as well as of others, was made 
a part of the Constitution of the United States . . . . We 
find it there, and the only question now is, as to the 
extent of its operation. 
That the clause in question (and indeed the whole 
article in which it appears) embraces every person 
within the limits and jurisdiction of the whole Union, 
will not be denied. . . . 
. . . 
It may with truth be affirmed, that most of the 
amendments to the Constitution contain principles 
which lie at the very foundation of civil liberty, and are 
most intimately connected with the dearest rights of the 
people. Principles which should be cherished and 
enforced by a just and parental government, to the 
utmost extent of its authority. Principles which, in 
reality, like those proclaimed from the burning mount, 
deserve to be diligently taught to our children, and to 
be written upon the posts of the houses, and upon the 
gates. 
. . . 
But the distinction which I have endeavored to 
establish between the limitations of power and the 
declarations of rights, is adopted in the clearest manner 
in the Constitution itself. The ninth article of the 
amendments declares, that ‘the enumeration in the 
Constitution of certain rights, shall not be construed to 
deny or disparage others retained by the people.’ And 
the tenth article provides, that ‘the powers not 
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor 
prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states 
respectively, or to the people.’ Here we see that the 
framers of these amendments had no ideal of 
confounding the limitations of power, and the 
declarations of rights; but treated each as distinct from 
the other. . . . [T]he ninth article was deemed necessary 
as it regarded the rights declared to exist, in order to 
prevent the people from being deprived of others by 
implication, that might not be included in the 
enumeration. 
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It appears clear to my mind, then, that the 
provision in the Constitution to which I have referred, 
instead of limiting the powers of the general 
government, directly calls into action those powers for 
the protection of . . . the great and fundamental right of 
personal liberty. 
_____________ 
 
Here we have a powerful recognition of fundamental but 
unenumerated human rights, rights of personal liberty, within a 
substantive vision of the concept of due process of law. These 
are affirmative rights, not simply limits on government power. 
Moreover, these rights require active government protection; 
and their existence is acknowledged by the Ninth Amendment. 
Judicial review of laws and other official acts, in this 
understanding, would be required in order that government not 
be permitted to violate these rights. That the unedited argument 
in the Appendix is actually about something else can hardly be 
said to alter the substantive understanding of the Due Process 
Clause that informs it. 
But a caveat is in order. Although this once-buried passage 
seems a beacon of liberty, in the antebellum period it would 
have been—to mix a metaphor—a two-edged sword. What if 
Chief Justice Taney had taken up the argument?22 Taney would 
hardly have been troubled by Van Ness’s insistence that the Due 
Process Clause “embraces every person within the limits and 
jurisdiction of the whole Union; we know that in Dred Scott 
Taney would read the Declaration of Independence’s “All men 
are created equal” as excluding blacks.23 Van Ness’s point, that 
the Fifth Amendment should protect the personal liberties of 
individuals from state as well as federal interference, if taken up 
by Taney in Jennison, would have become available in the future 
to extend the Fifth Amendment rationale of Dred Scott to the 
states’ own legislatures, within the states’ own borders. And 
insofar as Dred Scott’s Fifth Amendment would protect liberty, 
it would only be the liberty of slave masters to travel into free 
federal territory without losing their slave “property.” Dred 
Scott’s Fifth Amendment protected slavery, not liberty. 
 
 22. See generally Louise Weinberg, Overcoming Dred: A Counterfactual Analysis, 
24 CONST. COMMENT. 733 (2007). 
 23. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 410. 
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As constitutional law, of course, Dred Scott made its 
protection of slavery operative within the states, but only as 
against federal interference. Abraham Lincoln warned after 
Dred Scott that it would take just one more Taney Court 
decision to force slavery upon the free states, protecting 
“property” in human beings even from interference by a free 
state’s own legislature within the free state’s own borders.24 Had 
Taney adopted Van Ness’s invitation to extend the Fifth 
Amendment to the states, that next case after Dred Scott would 
have been all but decided, the plurality opinion in Jennison 
serving as convenient, perhaps controlling precedent. And the 
states, as Lincoln feared, would have been stripped of power to 
prohibit slavery on their own territory. 
The affirmative duty of protection to which Van Ness would 
summon Congress is equally troubling in the context of the 
antebellum period. It finds an echo in the extremist demand of 
the Deep South faction at the first Democratic convention in 
1860 that Congress enact a national slave code.25 Had Taney 
given authoritative voice to Van Ness’s argument, Jennison 
could have undergirded future Supreme Court validation of that 
national slave code. This was the demand that broke up the 
Democratic Party in 1860,26 ushering in Lincoln’s election and 
the crisis that followed. 
To appreciate and honor the words in this newly-discovered 
passage, while understanding the unique dangers they presented 
in their time—that is the claim this now-revealed, quite 
wonderful exposition makes upon the liberal mind. 
 
 24. See, e.g., Abraham Lincoln, Speech at Springfield, “A House Divided,” (June 
16, 1858), in CREATED EQUAL?: THE COMPLETE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES OF 
1858, at 1, 7 (Paul M. Angle ed., 1958). 
 25. For the development of the Southern demand for a national slave code, see 
ERIC H. WALTHER, WILLIAM LOWNDES YANCEY AND THE COMING OF THE CIVIL WAR 
(2006); JOSEPH HODGSON, THE CRADLE OF THE CONFEDERACY (photo. reprint 2005) 
(1876); Louise Weinberg, Dred Scott and the Crisis of 1860, 82 CHI-KENT L. REV. 97, 
125–31 (2007). 
 26. OFFICIAL PROCEEDINGS OF THE DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION, 
HELD IN 1860, AT CHARLESTON AND BALTIMORE, at 59, 65 passim (photo. reprint 2005) 
(John Gibson Parkhurst ed., 1860). 
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APPENDIX 
UNEDITED EXCERPT27 
CORNELIUS P. VAN NESS 
ARGUMENT FOR THE PLAINTIFF IN ERROR 
HOLMES V. JENNISON (1840)28 
We have now arrived at the third and last point; which is, 
that admitting a state to possess the right to act upon the subject 
of surrendering to foreign governments fugitives from justice, 
yet that the sovereign power of the state must be brought into 
action, and the surrenders made under a regular law or 
proceeding of such power; and that as [whether] the act now 
complained of was without any such authority, it was a violation 
of the provision in the Constitution of the United States which 
declares that ‘no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law.’ 
But here arises the question, whether this provision in the 
Constitution is applicable to the states; or, in other words, 
whether it constitutes a protection against the unlawful exercise 
of state power. I am aware that it has been decided by this 
Court, in the case of Barron vs. The City of Baltimore, 7 Peters, 
243, that the amendments to the Constitution of the United 
States, commonly called the bill of rights, were simply limitations 
of the powers of the general government, and had no effect upon 
the state governments. But as the decision is a recent one, and 
stands alone, I trust the Court will attend to me while I submit a 
few remarks upon a question so important and interesting. 
Let me begin by observing that the rule of construction 
which can generally be resorted to, in order to determine the 
sense of any provision in the original Constitution, cannot be 
applied to the articles of amendment. The Constitution itself was 
 
 27. The theory of substantive due process extracted in the foregoing paper from 
this original text is underlined. Brackets indicate summary or orthographical insertions 
made in the edited extract. 
 28. Jennison, 39 U.S. at 555–57. 
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one connected work, and was the result (if I may be allowed the 
expression) of a concentration of mind; and in deciding upon 
one part of it, reference may be had to other parts, and the 
whole so construed as consistently to stand together. But the 
case is very different as it regards the amendments. These have 
little or no connection with each other, varying both in their 
character and in their terms, and were originally proposed from 
different quarters, and with different objects. Each article, 
therefore, if not each clause, should be construed simply 
according to its own nature, and the terms in which it may be 
expressed. 
With the utmost deference I beg leave to observe, that in 
my humble judgment, an error was committed by the Court, in 
the case referred to, in supposing all the articles of amendment 
to be in the nature of limitations of governmental power, or to 
have been so intended at the time of their adoption. When we 
speak of a limitation of power, we have naturally in view some 
power which, without such limitation, might be lawfully 
exercised; and of this character are the prohibitions in the 
original Constitution, whether relating to the general 
government, or to the states. That some of the amendments are 
of the same character is unquestionably true. But there are 
others which are not so; among which is the one containing the 
clause declaring that ‘no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law.’ These latter cannot be 
considered as limitations of power, but are to be understood as 
declarations of rights. Of absolute rights, inherent in the people, 
and of which no power can legally deprive them. 
The right of personal liberty has existed ever since the first 
creation of man, and is incident to his nature. It has been 
recognised from the earliest organization of society, and the first 
institution of civil government, until the present time. And for 
the plain reason that this sacred right is beyond the reach of all 
legitimate power, it cannot properly be the subject of a 
limitation to the action of a regular government. Whether [T]he 
declaration of this right, as well as of others, was made a part of 
the Constitution of the United States, with a view, principally, of 
guarding it from violations by the general government, it is not 
material to inquire. We find it there, and the only question now 
is, as to the extent of its operation. 
That the clause in question (and indeed the whole article in 
which it appears) embraces every person within the limits and 
jurisdiction of the whole Union, will not be denied. All that 
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remains to be determined is, whether it is to be construed as 
leaving the states free to encroach upon the right which it 
declares every one shall enjoy; or whether it is to be understood 
as recognising and adopting the principle that no power from 
any quarter can do so. In other words, whether the clause was 
inserted because it was deemed more proper for the states than 
for the general government to deprive a person of his life or 
liberty without law; or, whether, to promulgate a general 
command against the violation of a right possessed by a title 
above all legitimate governmental power. 
If it should be supposed that in forming the Constitution, no 
protection was wanted from the general government against the 
illegal exercise of state power, the answer is, that this, though 
generally true, is by no means universally so. There are several 
restrictions upon the states in the Constitution, for the benefit 
and security of the people; and that, too, where the same powers 
are prohibited to the general government. One, for example, is, 
that no state shall pass ex post facto laws. And this is for the 
reason that no person ought to be punished by any government, 
for an act made criminal after the fact. Yet surely this principle is 
not more worthy of being guarded by the general government, 
than that a person shall not be twice punished for the same 
offence; or that he shall not be deprived of his life or liberty, 
except by due course of law. But we find that the United States 
stand pledged in the Constitution to guaranty to every state in 
the Union a republican form of government, and to protect each 
of them against domestic violence; thus becoming directly and 
deeply interested that state power shall not be unlawfully or 
improperly exercised. 
It may with truth be affirmed, that most of the amendments 
to the Constitution contain principles which lie at the very 
foundation of civil liberty, and are most intimately connected 
with the dearest rights of the people. Principles which should be 
cherished and enforced by a just and parental government, to 
the utmost extent of its authority. Principles which, in reality, 
like those proclaimed from the burning mount, deserve to be 
diligently taught to our children, and to be written upon the 
posts of the houses, and upon the gates. 
It is true, that most of the states have incorporated into their 
constitutions the same principles; though several of those 
instruments do not contain the important provision relied upon 
in this case. But this furnishes no argument against allowing 
them the force in the Constitution of the United States for which 
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I contend. Some of the state constitutions also contain the 
prohibition against passing ex post facto laws; but does this 
weaken the authority of the same restriction upon the states in 
the general Constitution? And is it not, moreover, very proper, 
that the state constitutions should themselves embrace all the 
provisions necessary to a good government, whether they are 
needed for the present, or not; since it cannot be foreseen what 
further amendments or alterations may take place in the 
Constitution of the United States. 
But the distinction which I have endeavoured to establish 
between the limitations of power and the declarations of rights, 
is adopted in the clearest manner in the Constitution itself. The 
ninth article of the amendments declares, that ‘the enumeration 
in the Constitution of certain rights, shall not be construed to 
deny or disparage others retained by the people.’ And the tenth 
article provides, that ‘the powers not delegated to the United 
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are 
reserved to the states respectively, or to the people.’ Here we see 
that the framers of these amendments had no idea of 
confounding the limitations of power, and the declarations of 
rights; but treated each as distinct from the other. If the 
amendments had treated only of the former, certainly the 
reservation, both to the states and to the people, in the tenth 
article, would have answered every purpose. But [T]he ninth 
article was deemed necessary as it regarded the rights declared 
to exist, in order to prevent the people from being deprived of 
others by implication, that might not be included in the 
enumeration. 
It appears clear to my mind, then, that the provision in the 
Constitution to which I have referred, instead of limiting the 
powers of the general government, directly calls into action 
those powers for the protection of the citizen. That it forms a 
part of the supreme law of the land, by which all the authorities 
of the states, as well as those of the Union, are bound. And that 
the establishment of the contrary doctrine would essentially 
weaken the security of the people; since it would leave without 
the protection of the paramount and superintending power of 
the Union, the great and fundamental right of personal liberty. 
